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Artificial immune system (AIS) allows us to inspire several ideas for the design of computer intrusion detection. 
The standard of negative selection algorithm (NSA), offered by Stephanie Forrest in 1994, is one of the most common 
mechanisms in AIS that applied in anomaly detection for the similarity of its basic idea. One of the most operational 
improvements in the standard of NSA is how to generate effective detectors which play a significant role in self and 
nonself discrimination in intrusion detection system (IDS). In this paper, we offer an improvement to a detector generating 
algorithm to generate effective detectors which leads to improve the standard of NSA, which in turn leads to improve the 
NSA based anomaly intrusion detection. Experimental results show that the improved algorithm able to generate more 
effective detectors and keeping the space and time complexities better than in the standard of NSA. This leads to detecting 
the real-time intrusion with less false negative. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Intrusion detection is a significant component of 
information processing system protection. It provides an 
additional layer of defense against computer abuse after 
physical, authentication and access control (Dasgupta, 
1999). The anomaly intrusion detection identifies the 
intrusion by the comparison between abnormal (i.e. 
anomaly) activities and the normal one of the protected 
system. The normal activities are maintained in the 
established normal profile which holds the model of the 
effective normal activity and detection methods. In order 
to resolve the problem in anomaly intrusion detection, 
there are some ways of Artificial Intelligence (AI) such as 
data mining, neural network, and artificial immune system 
(AIS). The AIS is a sub-field of computing inspired by the 
biological natural immune system. AIS gets us to inspire 
several ideas for solving intrusion problems by emulating 
the biological natural immune mechanism to discriminate 
"self" and "nonself": where "self" could be specified as 
many things, such as normal behavior, normal network 
traffic between computers and so on. One of the basic and 
most common approaches in AIS is the Negative Selection 
Approach (NSA), which is simple and easy to implement. 
It was employed in many studies, but mostly in anomaly 
detection for the similarity of its basic idea (Aziz, Azar, 
Hassanien and Hanafy, 2014). The standard of NSA has 
been offered in 1994. Since that time, a number of works 
have been proposed to improve the NSA standard so that it 
can be applied in designing real-time IDS. The algorithm 
proposed by Xian (Xian, 2009) has drawn our attention 
because of its simple idea of generating the effective 
detectors with less space and time complexities, 
comparing with the standard NSA, which run to design 
real-time NSA based anomaly IDS but, however, it costs a 
lot of false negative because the number of the generated 
effective detectors is quite small. Therefore, in this paper, 
we improve the work in (Xian, 2009) to generate more 
effective detectors for NSA based anomaly IDS with a low 
percentage of false negative as well as with less space and 
time complexities. 
 
NEGATIVE SELECTION MECHANISM 
 
Negative selection principle in biological immune 
system 
The human immune system (IS) is a truly 
amazing constellation of responses to attacks from outside 
the body. It has many facets, a number of which can 
switch to optimize the response to these unwanted 
intrusions (Haldar and Ahmad, 2010). The system is 
unusually effective, most of the time. The interaction 
among the IS and several other systems and organs allows 
the regulation of the body, ensuring its stable operation. 
The effect of this mechanism is that the IS is capable of 
distinguishing between organism's self cells and nonself 
cells. This procedure identifies the principle of negative 
selection of the organism's cells. Negative selection allows 
only the existence of those cells that do not recognize self 
cells. The cells are produced and undergo a maturation 
process known as immune tolerance in the thymus gland 
and bone marrow respectively, after that they are 
permitted to convey constituent in an immune response. In 
immune tolerance, cells will die if they have matched with 
self cells, and if not, they will become mature cells, and 
function as the true immune competent cells. 
 
Negative selection algorithm in artificial immune 
system 
The process of detection anomaly intrusion in a 
computer system can be considered as the process of 
distinguishing "self" and "nonself" in the immune system. 
In the light of this thought, Stephanie Forrest lead 
a research group in New Mexico University and proposed 
the immune negative selection algorithm in 1994 (Forrest, 
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Perelson, Allen and Cherukuri, 1994). In essence of this 
algorithm is to generate a set of detectors which do not 
recognize "self" but distinguish the "nonself" (viruses, 
worms, Trojan horses, spyware, unauthorized access, etc.) 
from "self" (protected data files, authorized users, etc.) 
(Forrest, Perelson, Allen and Cherukuri, 1994). This 
algorithm comprises two phases (Forrest, Hofmeyr, 
Somayaji and Longstaff, 1996): censoring and monitoring. 
The censoring stage serves for the generation of mature 
detectors which monitor the system being protected for 
changes. The algorithm builds a lot of competent detectors 
in the following steps (see Figure-1):  
Step 1: define a set of self (S). The data being 
protected is viewed as a string. The string is split into 
several l-length substrings. The set of self S consists of 
several substrings. 
Step 2: generate a set of random candidate 
detectors (Ro). They are also l-length strings and generate 
in some probability analytical ways. 
Step 3: generate a set of competent detectors (R). 
Strings from Ro that match self are eliminated. Strings that 
do not match any of the strings in S become members of 
the detector collection R. This step is called censoring. 
Step 4: monitor the changes of self. This is accomplished 
by continually choosing one detector in R and testing to 
find out if it matches with strings in S. If the self string 
matches one of the detector strings, a change would 
happen in S. Those changes are done probably for 




Figure-1. The generation of the repertoire (i.e. the 
competent detectors) by using the alphabet (0, 1) with 
r = 2 (Forrest, Perelson, Allen and Cherukuri, 1994). 
 
ARTIFICIAL IMMUNE NEGATIVE SELECTION 
ALGORITHM FOR THE ANOMALY INTRUSION 
DETECTION  
Here, we propose an improvement to the 
algorithm of detector genrating offered in (Xian, 2009) 
which can generate effective detectors in NSA based 
anomaly intrusion detection. This algorithm is better than 
the detector generating algorithm which offered by Forrest 
in 1996 on the speed and efficiency of generating detectors 
(Xin, 2009). The terms related to this algorithm and to our 
proposed improvement are defined in Table-1. 
 




The Rule of r-contiguous bits matching  
The r-contiguous bits matching rule states that the 
two character strings are matching if both strings have at 
least r bit continuous identical beginning from a particular 
position. (Ayara, Timmis, de Lemos, de Castro and 
Duncan, 2002). In Figure-2: if m =2, l =6, r =3, we can 




Figure-2. R-contiguous bits matching rule. 
 
Detectors generating algorithm 
` We use the idea of the algorithm proposed in 
(Xin, 2009) to get a more efficient algorithm of detector 
generating. 
If m, l and NS are given, then the competent 
detectors (NR) can be generated. First, we give the 
following definition: 
C: a character array of the length l, it is used to 
keep every new generated detector tentatively. 
Si: a substring of C, starting from the position i 
and its length is r (1 ≤ i ≤ l − r +1). 
The improved detector generating algorithm is 
presented as a flow diagram in Figure-3. 
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Figure-3. The improved detector generating algorithm. 
 
Figure-4 shows the example of generating 
process of a new detector '001111' using the Thread 2 of 
the improved detector generating algorithm shown in 
Figure-3. 
So, C = 0 0
Set C[2] = ' 1 ',
then C = 0 0 1
s 1 S1 1 S2 1 S3 1
001 110 100 111
S4 1 S5 1 S6 1
Not Match 110 110 100
Set C[3] = ' 1 ',
then C = 0 0 1 1
s 2 S1 2 S2 2 S3 2
011 101 001 111
S4 2 S5 2 S6 2
Not Match 101 101 001
Set C[4] = ' 1 ',
then C = 0 0 1 1 1
s 3 S1 3 S2 3 S3 3
111 010 010 110
S4 3 S5 3 S6 3
Not Match 010 011 010
Set C[5] = ' 1 ',
then C = 0 0 1 1 1 1
s 4 S1 4 S2 4 S3 4
111 100 101 100
S4 4 S5 4 S6 4
Not Match 101 110 100
The end C = 0 0 1 1 1 1
Figure 4: generating process of the detector ' 001111 '
Choosing the bit string ' 00 ', Initial  array C 
C array is a new competent detector  ' 001111 '
 
  
The Example in Figure-4: when we set m = 2, l = 
6, r = 3 and self collection includes 6 strings (i.e. NS = 6): 
S1= 110100, S2= 100101, S3=111100, S4=110101, 
S5=110110 and S6=100100, the algorithm generates 2r-1 = 
4 possible bit strings: ' 00 ', ' 01 ', ' 10 ' and ' 11 ', and then 
use them to initialize successively character array C. For 
example, if we choose the bit string ' 00 ', then Figure-4 
shows how to generate the detector ' 001111 ' using the 
Thread 2 of the flowchart in Figure-3. The Thread 3 will 
generate another detector which is '000000'. Figure-5 
shows the string space map that results from both Thread 2 
and Thread 3  of the flowchart with the same above-
mentioned sets (i.e. r =3, l = 6, m = 2 and NS = 6). 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
x x x x x x
x x x x x x
x x x x x x





Figure 5: Example of string space map that shows results of applying
 the offered algorithm when set: r  =3, l  = 6, m  = 2 and Ns  = 6.
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The time complexity of the algorithm is decided 
by the time to generate 2r −1 possible combinations and the 
time to extend detector by each combination. So the time 
complexity is o(2r −1(l – r + 1)NS). The space complexity is 
determined by the size of the array C. So the space 
complexity is o(l). 
The complexity of space and time of this 
algorithm is the same as in the algorithm proposed in 
(Xian, 2009). However the efficiency of our algorithm is 
better because its ability to generate more competent 
detectors (NR) with less holes (NH) which leads to decrease 
the probability of failing to detect nonself (Pf) 
significantly. 
 
Compute the "Holes"  
In accordance with the above-mentioned 
matching rule and self collection strings S, for some 
nonself strings, called “holes”, it is impossible to generate 
valid detectors, i.e. the hole string will never match any of 
the generated detectors. When the self collection has two 
strings like this: beginning with some assigned place and 
having the same numbers in more than r -1 adjacency bit, 
there are at least two holes which can’t be detected by any 
detector. Unfortunately the holes can not be avoidable. But 
too many holes mean that there are too many nonselfs 
which can not be detected, and there are also too much 
intrusion that can’t be detected (Xin, 2009). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
 
The Table-2 shows experimental results based on 
the detector generating algorithm. 
 
N R N H N D P f 
1 4 8 0.333
1 4 8 0.333
3 3 9 0.250
5 2 10 0.167
1 3 7 0.300
1 3 7 0.300
2 4 6 0.400
3 1 9 0.100
3 18 40 0.310
6 3 55 0.052
8 26 32 0.448
15 8 50 0.138
13 29 29 0.500
28 5 53 0.086
3 16 40 0.286
4 8 48 0.143
8 24 32 0.429
14 12 44 0.214
12 30 26 0.536
24 7 49 0.125
12 145 103 0.585
25 50 198 0.202
29 132 116 0.532
58 24 224 0.097
64 120 128 0.484
128 8 240 0.032
10 142 104 0.577
22 46 200 0.187
29 130 116 0.528
58 28 218 0.114
64 118 128 0.480































 S1=110100,  S2=100101,





 S1=110100,  S2=100101,








 S3= 11010010 S4= 11010101,
 S5= 11011010 S6= 11110001,





 S3= 11010010 S4= 11010101,
 S5= 11011010 S6= 11110001,
 S7= 11011110 S8= 10011001,
S9= 00001111 S10= 01010011
 
 
In Table-2 each of the columns  NR, NH, ND  and 
Pf depicts the values resulted from two different 
experiments (a) and (b), where the experiment (a) 
represents the algorithm proposed in (Xin, 2009), whereas 
the experiment (b) represents the algorithm with the 
improvement which we offer to get a better detector 
generating  algorithm regarding the efficiency.  
It is clear from the results in the Table-2 that the 
sizes of competent detectors (NR) in experiment (b) almost 
double comparing with the corresponding sizes in the 
experiment (a). This lead to that the sizes of the detected 
nonself (ND) in experiment (b) almost double comparing 
with the corresponding sizes in the experiment (a) and this 
lead in turn to that: 1) the sizes of holes (NH) in 
experiment (b), is less comparing with the corresponding 
sizes in the experiment (a). 2) The probability of failing to 
detect non-self (Pf) in experiment (b) gradually decreases 
comparing with the corresponding values in the 
experiment (a). As it was mentioned in the previous 
section, too many holes mean that there is too much 
intrusion that can’t be detected which means too much 
false negative reported by the anomaly IDS. With this in 
mind and through the analysis of the results in the Table-2, 
it is clear that the anomaly IDS that would be developed 
using our improved algorithm will report less false 
negative than those reported by the anomaly IDS which 
would be developed using the algorithm proposed in (Xin, 
2009). This is because, as we explained above, the size of 
holes resulted by our improved algorithm is quite less 
comparing with the corresponding size of holes resulted 
using the algorithm proposed in (Xin, 2009). 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we offered an improved and 
efficient algorithm for generating effective detectors 
needed to improve the performance of the standard NSA, 
which in turn can be used in computer intrusion detection 
design. We tested the algorithm to study: (1) its detector 
generating efficiency. (2) non-self detecting efficiency. 
The results demonstrate both, the efficiency of the detector 
generating and the efficiency of non-self detecting. 
Besides that, the improved algorithm keeps the space and 
time complexities better than the standard of NSA. This 
leads to detecting the real-time intrusion with less false 
negative. Therefore, our future work is to investigate the 
degree to which the proposed algorithm is able to integrate 
with the anomaly IDS architecture proposed in our 
previous work (Omar & Alsharafi, 2013) to enhance and 
improve the efficiency of the anomaly IDS model. We 
also plan to use the standard of NSA and the proposed 
detector generating algorithm to investigate whether is it 
possible to invent what we will call Abnormal Profile as a 
new concept in anomaly IDS beside the well known 
Normal profile concept. The expected abnormal profile 
will contains the effective detectors, generated by the 
NSA, which take on a significant role in self and nonself 
discrimination for anomaly IDS. 
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